Private Inference Beat

Public reference observatory

Route evidence and recent changes

Follow each client route from plaintext holder to reference policy and observed evidence. The dated adapter rows below describe checks performed by this repository; they are not full provider verdicts.

Published

Values or policy bytes available from a provider.

Accepted

Values a particular client or verifier permits.

Observed

Evidence returned on one route at a stated time.

These sets can differ during rollout or after retirement. A public file fetch proves publication, not signature validity, hardware state or request binding. How to read the evidence

Explore the reference history graph →
Observed workload changes, published reference sets, full values, and the evidence available to estimate change size.

Change timeline

809 recorded events · latest 20 shown

A new identity means newly observed by this sampling process. It does not establish a deployment date or authorize a new value.

Reviewed: needs evidence · aci-gateway/tee.redpill.ai

The tee.redpill.ai coverage_lost event compares a 2026-10-13 legacy adapter 'verified' row with a 2026-10-14 current 'not_checked' row. The newer verifier requires boot-measurement and request-path proof that the older result did not establish. Captured gateway quote, nonce, keyset, event-log and compose fields support several narrower bindings, but do not complete those missing checks. This is primarily an instrument-scope downgrade, not evidence that the provider changed to a compromised deployment. The three ACI hosts share one observed gateway workload; zero full-valid adapter results do not imply three compromised providers.

Confirmed immutable report/raw-evidence integrity, unchanged reported compose identity and the new explicit boot/request proof gap. The coverage event primarily corrects the instrument claim; it does not demonstrate a compromised deployment. The reported keyset change remains a separate unproven continuity question. Retain not_checked, do not expand accepted references, and verify boot measurements plus a bound backend request before a full-route claim.

Review and evidence ↗
publication_changed publication/private-inference-browser-verifier

00df62161a7edf2dae2f → 091dd1aea59fd62bd476 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/private-inference-chat-main

b88cfae3dbae6996b7ae → 4ed529979ee949a1f8c6 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/private-inference-chat-html

bbb9965ef104f335056a → 72d7d2c8dd658377d088 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
catalog_changed publication/private-inference-catalog

316a1ea3eb6a432e9571 → d1b16503e5a4b9127732 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/confidential-ai-releases

4cbdad1a7ef03f10dc3e → e6b6e0bfcb859d92e8b4 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/maple-legacy-pcrDevHistory.json

0436c8c622d6c917a1fe → 3e0e9072dff8cb6d3fe7 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/maple-canonical-pcrDevHistory.json

0436c8c622d6c917a1fe → 3e0e9072dff8cb6d3fe7 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/maple-legacy-pcrDev.json

c20af831ded57bc6496b → 6a16d138d5f70f52f9e8 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/maple-canonical-pcrDev.json

c20af831ded57bc6496b → 6a16d138d5f70f52f9e8 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported tinfoil/router · measurement

fc6a1c627b66f661b3748edddf4e5bce47358dedbaaa3f0d244f50e555ce24996fb9f36bf96c1836547510e965d0c6e4 → eb59905fbbb06279ebfd1d894c44591a69503c1c60a0fbd5ad59902a7af14fda9bca6221db7202b1ca23f9fdaf76008c

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported tinfoil/router · bundle_digest

d9beadbdb487812581c2432a6eaf2b6483d88565e70bd7eb39a78ad93eebbdba → 63ccf36e517f064725749c9feaf5c0521f4a4e8603398db9d7877f357757dfbc

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported near-ai/z-ai/glm-5.3-flash · compose_hash

2643bc7ae47ecf4cf84509a647d2c2cc3bcacad95a87b8a73d543e6c48ad3b22 → 53cd435edbc129f848ed0ddce301f7f192446fe39683713a38537820bea7e1fb

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_cell_reported near-ai/z-ai/glm-5.3-flash · compose_hash_committed

True → False

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported near-ai/z-ai/glm-5.3-flash · compose_hash

e8416a02d6f7ce47baaa52e3925b934fd30834b04fc9086b363db9b1d12c729d → fb81c6f2c1eae762ece8912e1f50e80697964cc93a112da03834369fa1ab5b0b

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_cell_reported near-ai/z-ai/glm-5.3-flash · tee_boot_config

True → False

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported near-ai/z-ai/glm-5.3-flash · image_digest

4cde8bc2e09b78452a2b7c6706a4072c7a46417d56eef8e75ccd6b6d91640ffb → d996bb08f36f0cc913ed7763f7c42bf4124e386a679e397a9acd8a3e69f3a704

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported near-ai/Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B · compose_hash

2643bc7ae47ecf4cf84509a647d2c2cc3bcacad95a87b8a73d543e6c48ad3b22 → 53cd435edbc129f848ed0ddce301f7f192446fe39683713a38537820bea7e1fb

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
untrusted_identity_reported near-ai/Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B · image_digest

4cde8bc2e09b78452a2b7c6706a4072c7a46417d56eef8e75ccd6b6d91640ffb → d996bb08f36f0cc913ed7763f7c42bf4124e386a679e397a9acd8a3e69f3a704

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
catalog_changed publication/private-inference-catalog

d447ea196f815d5fa9a4 → 316a1ea3eb6a432e9571 (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review
publication_changed publication/confidential-ai-releases

db3388e568252d1dccdb → 4cbdad1a7ef03f10dc3e (hash prefixes)

Event evidence ↗ Awaiting review

Client routes and plaintext holders

19 routes · inventory reviewed 2026-10-13

A model or brand can have multiple routes. Each card names who can receive plaintext and what its client accepts.

ACI gateway: tee.redpill.ai

TLS to gateway · HTTPS

partial

Plaintext holders

ACI gateway enclave; selected backend after gateway forwarding

Client acceptance

Current adapter checks selected gateway fields; independent quote-to-statement and backend-session binding remain under repair.

2 reference inputs
  • gateway: TDX quote, compose and keyset · published at live attestation endpoint · accepted by repository adapter (observed adapter check)
  • backend: session evidence digest · published at gateway report · accepted by unverified in adapter (self reported)
1 adapter row matched: tee.redpill.ai — adapter accepted

Open: Verify authenticated quote body binds reported keyset, nonce and compose payload; Verify backend session bundles

Next: Re-run negative binding tests and inspect live request route.

ACI gateway: inference.phala.com

TLS to gateway · HTTPS

partial

Plaintext holders

ACI gateway enclave; selected backend after gateway forwarding

Client acceptance

Hostname policy differs from the RedPill host; the shared gateway workload does not establish the selected backend.

2 reference inputs
  • gateway: TDX quote, compose and keyset · published at live attestation endpoint · accepted by repository adapter (observed adapter check)
  • backend: session evidence digest · published at gateway report · accepted by unverified in adapter (self reported)
1 adapter row matched: inference.phala.com — adapter accepted

Open: Verify authenticated quote bindings and backend session bundles

Next: Trace one harmless request through the selected route.

ACI gateway: api.redpill.ai

TLS to gateway · HTTPS

partial

Plaintext holders

ACI gateway enclave; potential non-TEE backend selected by policy

Client acceptance

This hostname's measured policy does not force TEE-only serving; a valid gateway quote cannot establish private backend execution.

1 reference input
  • gateway: TDX quote and measured domain policy · published at live attestation endpoint · accepted by repository adapter (observed adapter check)
1 adapter row matched: api.redpill.ai — adapter rejected

Open: Request-bound backend evidence absent

Next: Keep this hostname separate in route displays and test routing enforcement.

NEAR AI gateway, ordinary HTTPS

plain_gateway · HTTPS

partial

Plaintext holders

NEAR cloud-api gateway; selected model worker

Client acceptance

The adapter compares each requested model with its own anchor entry and records the authorization query's Base block number and hash. Chain authorization is operator policy, not independent client approval or request-path proof.

2 reference inputs
  • gateway: TDX compose hash · published at on-chain app authorization and live quote · accepted by repository adapter per observed hash at recorded Base block (observed adapter check)
  • worker: model compose hash · published at on-chain authorization and Hermes model mapping · accepted by repository adapter checks the requested model's own anchor entry; client policy remains separate (partially checked)
4 adapter rows matched: Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B — not checkedopenai/gpt-oss-120b — retiredz-ai/glm-5.3-flash — adapter rejectedzai-org/GLM-5.1-FP8 — retired
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-16T22:54.

Open: Authenticate compose-manager actions and model identity through the quote/event chain; Bind selected backend and encryption or TLS key to the actual request

Next: Verify the remaining authenticated model and request chain with controlled mismatches.

NEAR AI gateway with application encryption

verified_e2ee · application E2EE over HTTPS

candidate route

Plaintext holders

client before encryption; selected model TEE for protected fields; gateway may read unencrypted metadata and fields

Client acceptance

Client must authorize the requested model and bind the attested key before encryption; protection covers only selected fields. Open response-key substitution issue #1061 limits reply confidentiality.

1 reference input
  • worker: TDX compose, GPU and key · published at live quote plus model authorization · accepted by specific E2EE client implementation (source inspected)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-16T22:54.

Open: End-to-end request trace and response-key fix

Next: Test a pinned client with a harmless request and altered route/key.

NEAR AI experimental direct model endpoint

direct · direct model HTTPS/E2EE

candidate route

Plaintext holders

client before encryption; model worker after decryption

Client acceptance

Bypassing the gateway does not itself verify the direct channel; this repository's lightclient does not complete an encrypted request.

1 reference input
  • worker: model quote, key and authorization · published at live model endpoint and on-chain authorization · accepted by experimental client implementation (unverified)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-16T22:54.

Open: Authenticated action hash and quote binding; encrypted completion

Next: Verify each detached-to-authenticated link and complete a request.

Tinfoil router to model enclave

SDK or HTTPS · HPKE/TLS

partial

Plaintext holders

Tinfoil router enclave; selected model enclave

Client acceptance

Router's embedded repo pins and measured code can constrain worker admission; direct worker endpoints are currently unavailable for independent probes.

2 reference inputs
  • router: SEV-SNP measurement and Sigstore release · published at tagged GitHub release · accepted by repository adapter (observed adapter check)
  • worker: model enclave measurement · published at router trust configuration · accepted by router runtime re-attestation (source inspected)
1 adapter row matched: router — adapter rejected

Open: Independent AMD chain validation and worker request observation

Next: Preserve router release identity and regain worker evidence.

Venice E2EE via NEAR

Venice E2EE · application E2EE over HTTPS

partial

Plaintext holders

client before encryption; NEAR worker after decryption; Venice relay may read unencrypted fields

Client acceptance

Attestation reachability and selected-field encryption depend on the actual Venice client and model route.

1 reference input
  • near-worker: TDX quote and model key · published at Venice attestation endpoint · accepted by Venice client policy or repository adapter (partially checked)
2 adapter rows matched: e2ee-glm-5-1 — adapter rejectede2ee-qwen3-6-35b-a3b — adapter accepted
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-16T22:54.

Open: Request-bound model and key proof

Next: Refresh catalog and independently verify a sampled E2EE request.

Sources: venice.md ↗

Venice E2EE via Phala

Venice E2EE · application E2EE over HTTPS

partial

Plaintext holders

client before encryption; Phala worker after decryption; Venice relay may read unencrypted fields

Client acceptance

Phala backend evidence must be evaluated separately from NEAR-backed Venice routes.

1 reference input
  • phala-worker: worker quote and model key · published at Venice attestation endpoint · accepted by Venice client policy or repository adapter (partially checked)
3 adapter rows matched: e2ee-gemma-4-31b — unavailablee2ee-gpt-oss-120b-p — adapter rejectede2ee-qwen3-6-35b-a3b-uncensored-p — adapter rejected
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-16T22:54.

Open: Some endpoints return no evidence; request-bound model and key proof

Next: Refresh catalog and distinguish missing evidence from failed verification.

Sources: venice.md ↗

Chutes TEE model route

Chutes API · HTTPS and encrypted worker transport

partial

Plaintext holders

API-side processing according to selected protocol; worker process and model

Client acceptance

MRTD identifies the dstack base TD but does not measure serve.py or model weights; matching the golden set is a narrower fact than workload approval.

1 reference input
  • worker: TDX MRTD · published at provider golden set · accepted by repository adapter and audit ledger (observed adapter check)
6 adapter rows matched: DeepSeek-V3.2-TEE — not checkedGLM-5.1-TEE — not checkedGLM-5.2-TEE — not checkedKimi-K2.6-TEE — not checkedQwen3-32B-TEE — retiredgemma-4-31B-TEE — adapter rejected
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-16T22:54.

Open: Serving code and model artifact outside measured registers

Next: Inventory all confidential catalog models and investigate any unpublished MRTD.

Private Inference standard routing

standard · OpenAI-compatible HTTPS

provider claim

Plaintext holders

Private Inference proxy; selected supplier

Client acceptance

Standard routing makes no TEE-private claim; its supplier may be 0G, CheaperInference or OpenRouter according to published product description.

No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
4 public source captures for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: Request-specific supplier unknown

Next: Track separately from private beta; do not score as confidential execution.

Private Inference zero-data-retention routing

zdr · OpenAI-compatible HTTPS

provider claim

Plaintext holders

Private Inference proxy; selected supplier

Client acceptance

ZDR is a retention policy and does not encrypt prompts from the Private Inference proxy.

No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
4 public source captures for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: Retention enforcement and selected supplier unverified

Next: Keep retention claim outside confidentiality score.

Private Inference private beta via NEAR

private beta browser · browser E2EE over HTTPS

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

browser before encryption; NEAR model TEE; relay can expose reply through unbound response-key header

Client acceptance

Inspected browser checks quote self-consistency but does not compare compose or OS image to an approved baseline; response key remains relay-substitutable per NEAR issue #1061.

2 reference inputs
  • browser: deployed JS bundle · published at privateinference.gg/chat · accepted by web delivery (source inspected)
  • near-worker: TDX compose and OS image · published at attestation endpoint · accepted by browser self-consistency checks; no approved baseline seen (unapproved reference)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
4 public source captures for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: Attestation endpoint returned 401 without key; No independent approved model-to-workload baseline; Response-key binding gap

Next: Obtain authorized test key, verify a fresh quote and harmless encrypted completion, and test wrong-model rejection.

Maple Research or proxy via Tinfoil

web/native/SDK/local proxy · Nitro session then Tinfoil backend

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

browser or local proxy before encryption; Maple OpenSecret Nitro enclave; Tinfoil router and worker enclaves

Client acceptance

SDK embedded roots can continue to accept an old PCR0; mutable signed histories authorize PCR0 text only. Upstream Tinfoil must be established separately.

2 reference inputs
  • opensecret: Nitro PCR0 · published at canonical and legacy signed histories · accepted by embedded SDK roots plus history on miss (publication monitored)
  • tinfoil: router and model measurement · published at Tinfoil releases · accepted by OpenSecret Tinfoil SDK (source inspected)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
11 public source captures for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: No live Nitro/session evidence; No independent EIF rebuild; No request-bound upstream worker evidence

Next: Pin shipped client and source release, capture a fresh Nitro handshake, then trace chosen Tinfoil route.

Maple Research or proxy via Continuum/Privatemode

web/native/SDK/local proxy · Nitro session then loopback sidecar

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

browser or local proxy before encryption; Maple OpenSecret Nitro enclave; Continuum sidecar in Nitro image; Privatemode worker

Client acceptance

Nitro PCR0 covers checked-in sidecar bytes if deployed EIF matches source, but no source-to-binary or onward Privatemode proof has been established.

3 reference inputs
  • opensecret: Nitro PCR0 · published at canonical and legacy signed histories · accepted by embedded SDK roots plus history on miss (publication monitored)
  • continuum-sidecar: binary in measured Nitro rootfs · published at Maple source tree · accepted by Nitro PCR0 transitively (source inspected)
  • privatemode-worker: Privatemode manifest · published at CDN manifest · accepted by sidecar policy not yet inspected (unknown)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
11 public source captures for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: No live Nitro/session evidence; Sidecar policy and upstream key exchange uninspected; No independent EIF rebuild

Next: Inspect sidecar source/build provenance and verify its onward Privatemode request.

Sources: maple.md ↗

Privatemode proxy with automatic manifest

proxy auto-update · local proxy to attested backend

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

local proxy; Coordinator and secret service where key material is handled; selected model worker

Client acceptance

Default proxy can auto-adopt the latest provider manifest; a successful retry means agreement with current provider publication, not an independently pinned policy.

1 reference input
  • worker: SNP/TDX policies and GPU/model roots · published at CDN manifest · accepted by proxy fetches latest and retries after validation failure (publication monitored)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: No live key exchange/completion; Manifest policy values not independently reproduced; Coordinator and secret-service admission unverified

Next: Pin exact manifest, inspect all policies and test update/failure behavior.

Privatemode proxy with pinned manifest

proxy pinned · local proxy to attested backend

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

local proxy; Coordinator and secret service where key material is handled; selected model worker

Client acceptance

Locally pinned manifest may reject provider updates until operator review; actual fail-closed behavior requires a controlled request test.

1 reference input
  • worker: SNP/TDX policies and GPU/model roots · published at locally pinned CDN manifest copy · accepted by proxy --manifest-path (publication monitored)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: No pinned-client request test; Policy reproduction and key distribution unverified

Next: Test old/new manifest and mutated quote before sending a harmless prompt.

Privatemode proxyless API

proxyless · HTTPS

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

Privatemode service front door and backend according to deployed route

Client acceptance

Documentation says this path currently lacks client-side attestation; it needs a separate verdict from local proxy modes.

1 reference input
  • service: provider internal attestation policy · published at trust documentation · accepted by provider on caller's behalf (provider claim)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
1 public source capture for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: No client-visible verified recipient or key binding

Next: Document actual TLS termination and provider-side checks before scoring.

Sources: ↗

Confidential AI Inference API

HTTPS API / TEErminator · TLS at c8s TEE then protected mesh

candidate unverified

Plaintext holders

tls-lb TEE; gateway; SGLang router and workers; operator access paths described in threat model

Client acceptance

Read-only allowlist and release capture does not verify Sigstore, hardware quote, exact TLS session, GPU evidence or request route. Public threat model documents operator/control-plane access paths.

2 reference inputs
  • tls-lb: TDX MRTD/RTMR, TLS cert and nonce · published at attestation endpoint and signed release · accepted by TEErminator with operator-reviewed pins (publication monitored)
  • worker: c8s allowlist and workload receipts · published at allowlist endpoint and signed release · accepted by client verifier policy (publication monitored)
No matched request observation. This route has an inventory or source review only.
3 public source captures for this provider; publication only, last attempt 2026-11-19T21:33.

Open: No cryptographic live proof; Operator key and unencrypted control-plane disk concerns; No request-bound worker/model proof

Next: Match live attestation to signed release and allowlist; test pinned TEErminator against same TLS session.

Public reference captures

Read-only HTTP captures preserve exact bytes and hashes. Every row here has no signature or quote verification. A fetch error keeps the last successful hash for continuity.

chutes

1 fetched · 0 errors

confidential-ai

3 fetched · 0 errors

maple

11 fetched · 0 errors

near-ai

1 fetched · 0 errors

private-inference

4 fetched · 0 errors

privatemode

1 fetched · 0 errors

venice

1 fetched · 0 errors

Maple canonical ↔ legacy: pcrDev.json match · pcrDevHistory.json match · pcrProd.json match · pcrProdHistory.json match. Byte agreement at this vantage does not validate signatures or live PCRs.

Inspect 22 captured sources and hashes
SourceStateObservedSHA-256 / last success
maple-canonical-pcrProd.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:33987da06b13f76682df94b5b272e6f5d9253d696faaee5970d3b30597f1c5592f raw bytes
maple-legacy-pcrProd.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:33987da06b13f76682df94b5b272e6f5d9253d696faaee5970d3b30597f1c5592f raw bytes
maple-canonical-pcrProdHistory.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:33a2c7a777bd8618ca723e7de57c6fac2ad2c6e3987e911d6481fa810abe9d36a9 raw bytes
maple-legacy-pcrProdHistory.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:33a2c7a777bd8618ca723e7de57c6fac2ad2c6e3987e911d6481fa810abe9d36a9 raw bytes
maple-canonical-pcrDev.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:336a16d138d5f70f52f9e89ad4bbe6221bb4451f469b7c46b9de5b269ef66f4443 raw bytes
maple-legacy-pcrDev.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:336a16d138d5f70f52f9e89ad4bbe6221bb4451f469b7c46b9de5b269ef66f4443 raw bytes
maple-canonical-pcrDevHistory.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:333e0e9072dff8cb6d3fe7092ae84fb64c554f886c8ab4cb514ff463156ea8dd58 raw bytes
maple-legacy-pcrDevHistory.jsonobserved2026-11-19T21:333e0e9072dff8cb6d3fe7092ae84fb64c554f886c8ab4cb514ff463156ea8dd58 raw bytes
maple-typescript-pcr-policyobserved2026-11-19T21:33f001d931e588c0c9b072be4b03b5b54adc94c8f82443b1bc616f7c7c87cb65fb raw bytes
maple-rust-pcr-policyobserved2026-11-19T21:3303f9d8fd5dd944506a90ece4e2bb620a65a8406ed307b063d1456a3245931cd6 raw bytes
maple-research-client-configobserved2026-11-19T21:33646fa8962420650e74df69efa9a5e4df480a56d9a4a23ab0fca5297b562d428f raw bytes
privatemode-manifestobserved2026-11-19T21:33d63eb5cf91cb3079fe25a848573a4d0e9d869f462dab4f71fd02bdb372f8e833 raw bytes
confidential-ai-allowlistobserved2026-11-19T21:33251eaf57d70dda5b2f6e292bf898cb339993a81a99381d195d45f580708da113 raw bytes
confidential-ai-releasesobserved2026-11-19T21:33e6b6e0bfcb859d92e8b4715ced1dcb398142fb9d92e3007e099cd44c18e0dacd raw bytes
confidential-ai-observed-releaseobserved2026-11-19T21:335bd314d094d6e3798bc75024afcf1e56360d260c03854fe94c056ffa2f433303 raw bytes
private-inference-catalogobserved2026-11-19T21:33d1b16503e5a4b912773231a59a93ddb6c1e388732004ec933128701578f5b0c3 raw bytes
private-inference-chat-htmlobserved2026-11-19T21:3372d7d2c8dd658377d088d1e596ce4f6255860c92bd66a53e8a4d67ea5f161c38 raw bytes
private-inference-chat-mainobserved2026-11-19T21:334ed529979ee949a1f8c6cb27dc32885351b79f0ce6808d959a9a52e63c776310 raw bytes
private-inference-browser-verifierobserved2026-11-19T21:33091dd1aea59fd62bd47658b17fade27615578a577304dd21ae5a25bb0d0c6e73 raw bytes
near-ai-modelsobserved2026-11-16T22:54a95e1981f3e0ebfed90a4efe57e1fee218acf28f7f2f80469abb8eb898a61f25 raw bytes
chutes-modelsobserved2026-11-16T22:54a7648851318072601c56da0d4e476ba1e34240fc2deedffd8a6a68deb5da5ded raw bytes
venice-modelsobserved2026-11-16T22:543e7c56c4a2cd61d5459aa8d70b5a916ece8cb613fd2fd05743d0b2ad2e8ed273 raw bytes

Current adapter observations

An adapter pass means its scoped code accepted a response. Unavailable evidence, an incomplete check and a checked rejection are different outcomes. See each route card for plaintext and policy gaps.

TargetOutcomeReason / checked atChecks
aci-gateway/api.redpill.aiAdapter rejectedunspecified
2026-11-19T21:32:08Z
11 checked fields
× TEE route enforcedn/a Backend check✓ Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced build✓ Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway reviewn/a GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh nonce✓ OS archive metadata✓ Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime confign/a Serving code✓ Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot confign/a Debug disabled✓ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
aci-gateway/inference.phala.comAdapter acceptedunspecified
2026-11-19T21:32:08Z
11 checked fields
✓ TEE route enforcedn/a Backend check✓ Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced build✓ Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway reviewn/a GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh nonce✓ OS archive metadata✓ Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime confign/a Serving code✓ Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot confign/a Debug disabled✓ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
aci-gateway/tee.redpill.aiAdapter acceptedunspecified
2026-11-19T21:32:08Z
11 checked fields
✓ TEE route enforcedn/a Backend check✓ Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced build✓ Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway reviewn/a GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh nonce✓ OS archive metadata✓ Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime confign/a Serving code✓ Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot confign/a Debug disabled✓ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
chutes/DeepSeek-V3.2-TEENot checkedverification_incomplete
2026-11-19T21:33:00Z
5 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforcedn/a Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced buildn/a Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config× Serving coden/a Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisaln/a Boot confign/a Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
chutes/GLM-5.1-TEENot checkedverification_incomplete
2026-11-19T21:33:01Z
5 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforcedn/a Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced buildn/a Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config× Serving coden/a Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisaln/a Boot confign/a Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
chutes/GLM-5.2-TEENot checkedverification_incomplete
2026-11-19T21:32:57Z
5 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforcedn/a Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced buildn/a Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config× Serving coden/a Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisaln/a Boot confign/a Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
chutes/Kimi-K2.6-TEENot checkedverification_incomplete
2026-11-19T21:33:26Z
5 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforcedn/a Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced buildn/a Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config× Serving coden/a Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisaln/a Boot confign/a Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
chutes/Qwen3-32B-TEERetiredRemoved from the probe catalog on 2026-11-15: Chutes removed the chute: all 20 captures 2026-10-26..2026-11-14 answered HTTP 404 "Chute not found" for chute_id ac059e33-eb27-541c-b9a9-24b214036475
2026-11-16T22:52:50.183784Z
0 checked fields
chutes/gemma-4-31B-TEEAdapter rejectedunspecified
2026-11-19T21:33:05Z
5 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforcedn/a Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced buildn/a Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway review× GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config× Serving coden/a Session digest listingn/a TCB current✓ TDX appraisaln/a Boot confign/a Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
near-ai/Qwen/Qwen3.8-27BNot checkedverification_incomplete
2026-11-19T21:32:14Z
11 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforced? Backend check #29n/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced build✓ Compose binding✓ Event-log replay× Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE key✓ Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime confign/a Serving coden/a Session digest listing✓ TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot config✓ Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
near-ai/openai/gpt-oss-120bRetiredRemoved from the probe catalog on 2026-11-15: NEAR no longer serves this model: 23 captures 2026-10-13..2026-11-14 answered HTTP 400 "Model 'openai/gpt-oss-120b' not found"; the other 15 were 503s and timeouts, none an attestation
2026-11-16T22:52:50.089152Z
0 checked fields
near-ai/z-ai/glm-5.3-flashAdapter rejectedunspecified
2026-11-19T21:32:19Z
11 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforced? Backend check #29n/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client noncen/a Reproduced build× Compose binding✓ Event-log replay× Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE key✓ Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime confign/a Serving coden/a Session digest listing✓ TCB current✓ TDX appraisal× Boot config✓ Debug disabledn/a Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
near-ai/zai-org/GLM-5.1-FP8RetiredRemoved from the probe catalog on 2026-11-15: NEAR serves a different model under this id: all 34 attestations 2026-10-14..2026-11-14 came from a model CVM reporting z-ai/glm-5.3-flash, which no anchor covers (anchored: false)
2026-11-16T22:52:50.139785Z
0 checked fields
tinfoil/routerAdapter rejectedTCB below AMD-published minimum: {'snp': '0x1b < 0x1d'}
2026-11-19T21:32:20Z
2 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforcedn/a Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog serving× Client noncen/a Reproduced buildn/a Compose bindingn/a Event-log replayn/a Gateway reviewn/a GPU evidence✓ Hardware signature· HPKE keyn/a Address bindingn/a Release measurementn/a Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadatan/a Production OSn/a Release provenancen/a Key binding· Runtime confign/a Serving coden/a Session digest listingn/a TCB currentn/a TDX appraisaln/a Boot confign/a Debug disabledn/a Hardware config· TLS key pin
venice/e2ee-gemma-4-31bUnavailableno TEE attestation available for this model (404)
2026-11-19T21:32:24Z
0 checked fields
— TEE route enforced— Backend check— Catalog nonempty— Catalog serving— Client nonce— Reproduced build— Compose binding— Event-log replay— Gateway review— GPU evidence— Hardware signature— HPKE key— Address binding— Release measurement— Fresh nonce— OS archive metadata— Production OS— Release provenance— Key binding— Runtime config— Serving code— Session digest listing— TCB current— TDX appraisal— Boot config— Debug disabled— Hardware config— TLS key pin
venice/e2ee-glm-5-1Adapter rejectedadapter_rejected
2026-11-19T21:32:22Z
11 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforced× Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client nonce∅ Reproduced build #11✓ Compose binding✓ Event-log replayn/a Gateway review∅ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE key✓ Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadata∅ Production OS #11n/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config∅ Serving code #11n/a Session digest listing✓ TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot config✓ Debug disabled✓ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
venice/e2ee-gpt-oss-120b-pAdapter rejectedadapter_rejected
2026-11-19T21:32:25Z
11 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforced× Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client nonce∅ Reproduced build #11✓ Compose binding✓ Event-log replayn/a Gateway review∅ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE key✓ Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadata∅ Production OS #11n/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config∅ Serving code #11n/a Session digest listing✓ TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot config✓ Debug disabled✓ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
venice/e2ee-qwen3-6-35b-a3bAdapter acceptedadapter_accepted
2026-11-19T21:32:24Z
9 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforced× Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client nonce∅ Reproduced build #11✓ Compose binding∅ Event-log replayn/a Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE key✓ Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadata∅ Production OS #11n/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config∅ Serving code #11n/a Session digest listing✓ TCB current✓ TDX appraisal∅ Boot config✓ Debug disabled∅ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin
venice/e2ee-qwen3-6-35b-a3b-uncensored-pAdapter rejectedadapter_rejected
2026-11-19T21:32:28Z
12 checked fields
n/a TEE route enforced× Backend checkn/a Catalog nonemptyn/a Catalog servingn/a Client nonce∅ Reproduced build #11✓ Compose binding✓ Event-log replayn/a Gateway review✓ GPU evidencen/a Hardware signaturen/a HPKE key✓ Address bindingn/a Release measurement✓ Fresh noncen/a OS archive metadata∅ Production OS #11n/a Release provenance✓ Key bindingn/a Runtime config∅ Serving code #11n/a Session digest listing✓ TCB current✓ TDX appraisal✓ Boot config✓ Debug disabled✓ Hardware confign/a TLS key pin

Sampling and audit limits

4031 historical provider/model observations over 208 sampled dates. Error-string buckets include 917 transport-classified rows and 579 invalid rows with no recorded reason. These correlated samples do not estimate a provider failure rate or detector sensitivity.

Newly observed identities are first sightings, not confirmed deployments. Inspect sampled identity cadence and gaps. Published references, accepted policy, and same-request proof remain separate evidence.